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THE CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC DEFENDER:
Its Origins, Evolution and Decline
LAURENCE A. BENNER*
"It is still the duty of the State and of the court, its instrument, quite
as much to protect the innocent as to punish the guilty. Honest
administration of justice is the end sought. .
- Clara Shortridge Foltz, 1897
INTRODUCTION
A s California approaches the centennial of the birth of the first PublicDefender office in the state and the nation, it is perhaps appropriate to
reflect upon the reasons for establishing an institutional Public Defender
as part of government and make an appraisal of the institution's current
* Laurence A. Benner is Professor of Law and Managing Director of Criminal
Justice Programs at California Western School of Law in San Diego, California, where
he directs the San Diego Search Warrant Project, the Bail Project and the Center for
the Advanced Study of Criminal Justice. He is co -founder of the Institute for Criminal
Defense Advocacy, which operates the California Innocence Project. He is coauthor of
L. BENNER AND B. NEARY, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE, NLADA (1973) [hereinafter
THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE].
1 Clara Shortridge Foltz, Public Defenders, 31 AM. L. REV. 393, 395 (1897) [Foltz,
Public Defenders].
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health in California today. The concept of the Public Defender, considered
radical at the time of its inception, was initially the brainchild of Clara
Shortridge Foltz. A champion of women's rights and the first woman ad-
mitted to practice law in California, she spearheaded a national movement
to create an elected office known as the Public Defender. The County of Los
Angeles became the first government to establish a Public Defender office,
which began providing representation in both criminal and certain civil
cases in 1914. What would Clara Foltz think of the Public Defender system
as it has evolved in California today? How does our present system differ
from what she envisioned?
Sadly, while the road has been marked with many successes, and forti-
fied by U.S. Supreme Court decisions establishing the right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, if Clara Foltz were
to return today she would find a criminal justice system that has broken
faith with one of its fundamental underlying premises: the presumption
of innocence. Instead, as a consequence of local funding and control over
indigent defense services, many counties have chosen to operate under
a presumption of guilt, resulting in a system where processing the "pre-
sumed guilty" as cheaply as possible has been made a higher priority than
investigating the possibility of their innocence.
This should not be surprising. Members of a county board of supervi-
sors, many of whom are not lawyers, can easily be persuaded by political
pressures arising from the competition for scarce tax dollars to provide
only minimal resources for the defense of those who are accused of crime.
That translates into just enough funding to facilitate the plea bargaining
regime upon which the entire system relies, as no county has the resources
to have trials in all cases. This may seem logical because many defendants
are in fact guilty. But the system is based upon a false premise. It is as-
sumed that those who are providing defense representation will somehow
be able to distinguish between the many who are guilty and the few who
are innocent. It also further assumes that the indigent defense system will
be able to provide an effective defense for the innocent by managing to
triage the limited resources available. This cannot be done, however, if the
system does not ensure adequate defense investigation into the possibility
of innocence in the first place. Yet recent empirical research conducted
for the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice has
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shown that the current structure within which indigent defense services
are provided in many counties fails to ensure this important safeguard.
This is not to say that all of California's counties across the board are
providing indigent defense services that are inadequate. What Clara Foltz
would immediately recognize, however, are the glaring disparities that
exist between counties in the adequacy of indigent defense services they
provide. She would also be struck, although not surprised, by the tremen-
dous disparity in funding that exists between the defense and the pros-
ecution functions. Finally, she would no doubt be alarmed at the growing
trend toward unregulated privatization of indigent defense services that
threatens the very existence of competent and efficient institutional Public
Defender offices. This is because in an ever expanding number of counties
justice is now up for sale to the lowest bidder.
ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER CONCEPT
Clara Foltz first introduced her proposal for an elected Public Defender in
a speech at the Chicago World's Fair in 1893, given before the Congress of
Jurisprudence and Law Reform.2 She envisioned the Public Defender as
a counterweight to even the scales of justice and correct the "grave evils"
that plagued the administration of criminal justice in her day.3 As she
later explained in a law review article, "judicial crimes"4 were repeatedly
being committed because of 1) the abuses of unchecked and overzealous
prosecutors,5 2) the incompetence of untrained, inexperienced and unpaid
appointed counsel for the indigent accused,6 and 3) the buzzard mentality
2 The speech was reprinted in the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL: Public Defenders -
Rights of Persons Accused of Crime - Abuses Now Existing, 48 ALB. L.J. 248 (1893)
[WORLD'S FAIR SPEECH]. Other notable presenters at the Congress included John Henry
Wigmore, David Dudley Field and James Bradley Thayer. See generally Barbara Bab-
cock, Inventing the Public Defender, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1267 (2006) [Babcock] for an
excellent account of the life and times of Clara Shortridge Foltz and the influences that
led her to originate the idea of a publicly funded attorney for all defendants accused of
crime.
3 See Foltz, Public Defenders, supra note 1.
4 Id. at 393.
5 Id. at 395-97.
6 Id. at 399.
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and dishonesty of a "shyster" element among the private bar who preyed
upon those defendants with meager resources. 7
Called the "Portia of the Pacific," 8 Foltz was at the time of her World's
Fair speech an able and experienced criminal defense practitioner, who
shortly afterwards would win a notable victory in the California Supreme
Court. In People v. Wells9 - a case involving prosecutorial misconduct -
she represented a successful business agent who had been charged as an
accomplice to a client's forgery involving a promissory note and mortgage.
Wells testified he had been deceived by the client who falsely represented
herself as the owner of property which was mortgaged to secure the loan.
The California Supreme Court reversed Wells's conviction because of "ut-
terly inexcusable and reprehensible" conduct by the prosecutor who re-
peatedly employed improper questions on both direct and cross examina-
tion to interject inadmissible and unsubstantiated accusations for the sole
purpose of prejudicing the jury against the defendant. In granting a new
trial, Justice McFarland declared in a revealing statement:
It is too much the habit of prosecuting officers to assume before-
hand that a defendant is guilty, and then expect to have the estab-
lished rules of evidence twisted, and all the features of a fair trial
distorted, in order to secure a conviction. If a defendant cannot
be fairly convicted, he should not be convicted at all; and to hold
otherwise would be to provide ways and means for the conviction
of the innocent.10
Foltz identified the causes of such prosecutorial abuse as naturally aris-
ing from human nature - the prosecutor's "vanity of winning," and "the
fear of newspaper criticism" coupled with the ability to rationalize such
7 Id. at 397-98.
8 See Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 12, 1888 at 2, and Nicholas C. Polos, San Diego's
'Portia of the Pacific'- California's First Woman Lawyer, 26 JOURNAL OF SAN DIEGO
HISTORY, No. 3, Summer 1980, San Diego Historical Society. Clara Foltz was an elo-
quent advocate. For an excerpt from one of her closing arguments, see MICHAEL S.
LIEF, ET AL., LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: GREATEST CLOSING ARGUMENTS
IN MODERN LAW, Chapter 6, A Man's World No More, 211 (1998).
9 100 Cal. 459 (1893). Wells was subsequently referenced by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), a seminal case on prosecutorial
misconduct.
10 Id. at 465.
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behavior through the jaded "assumption that the defendant is always
guilty."" Prosecutors were allowed to go unchecked, Foltz argued, because
with rare exception they had no equal adversary. She pointed out that
counsel appointed for the poor "have no money to spend in an investiga-
tion of the case, and come to trial wholly unequipped either in ability, skill
or preparation to cope with the man hired by the State." 1 2 Those of modest
means, moreover, had neither the knowledge nor the ability from within
the walls of their jail cell to secure competent counsel. They were thus easy
marks for the "runners" of unscrupulous "shyster" lawyers who, after hav-
ing obtained a defendant's money, would "botch or neglect" their case. 1 3
11 Foltz, Public Defenders, supra note 1, at 396.
12 WORLD'S FAIR SPEECH, supra note 2, at 249.
13 Foltz, Public Defenders, supra note 1, at 397. A vivid account of how such shy-
ster lawyers operated in the lower criminal courts of New York is described in ARTHUR
TRAIN, THE PRISONER AT THE BAR (1915) 76-77:
A young girl who had fallen from virtue, but who had never been arrested be-
fore, was brought into the Jefferson Market prison. She had saved five hundred
dollars with which she intended the following week to return to her native
town in New Hampshire and start life anew. The [jailer] led her to believe that
she would be imprisoned in the penitentiary for nearly a year unless she could
"beat the case." One of these buzzards [i.e. a shyster lawyer] learned of her
distress and offered to procure bail for her for the sum of fifty dollars. A straw
bondsman was produced, and she paid him the money and was liberated.
Meanwhile the lawyer had learned of the existence of her five hundred dollars.
By terrifying her with all sorts of stories as to what would possibly happen to
her, he succeeded in inducing her to pay him three hundred as a retainer to
appear for her at the hearing in the magistrate's court. He had guaranteed to
get her off then and there, but when her case was called he happened to be
engaged in reading a newspaper and, looking up from where he was sitting,
merely remarked, "Waives examination, your Honor." The girl had only one
hundred and fifty dollars left, and as yet had had no defense, but the shyster
now demanded and received one hundred dollars more for representing her in
the Special Sessions. She now had but fifty dollars. Immediately after the hear-
ing in the police court the bondsman "surrendered" her and she was locked
up in the Tombs pending her trial, for she had not money enough to secure
another bail bond. Here she languished three or four days. When at last her
case appeared upon the calendar the shyster did not even take the trouble to
come to court himself, but telephoned to another buzzard that she still had
fifty dollars, telling him to " take her on." Abandoned by her counsel, alone
and in prison, she gave up the last cent she had, hoping thus still to escape
the dreadful fate predicted for her. When she was called to the bar the second
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Indeed, at the time of the Wells decision California did not even have an
integrated State Bar that could control the admission to practice law.14 The
reputation of the legal profession also hardly inspired confidence. As one
of Foltz's contemporaries observed, the bar in general was considered "a
pool of mediocrity."' 5
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ENVISIONED
BY CLARA FOLTZ
To remedy the evils afflicting the administration of criminal justice, Clara
Foltz proposed that an office of the Public Defender be created in each
county. The Public Defender was to be elected and hold office for a three-
year term. Only an attorney who had been a resident of the county for at
least one year was eligible to stand for election. The duties of the Public
Defender were "to attend all criminal courts, and to appear for and defend
all persons charged with violation of the law who are without counsel and
who desire an attorney to appear for them."16 The Public Defender's duties
also included "appearing for and in behalf of all persons charged with be-
ing insane or lunatic."17 The Public Defender was empowered to hire assis-
tant Public Defenders and employees when such positions were authorized
by the county.18 When a capital or "other important criminal action" was
lawyer informed her she had no defense and the best thing she could do was
to plead guilty. This she did and was fined twenty-five dollars, but, having now
no money, was compelled to serve out her time, a day for each dollar, in the
City Prison, at the end of which time she was cast penniless upon the streets.
14 The California State Bar was not created until 1927.
15 MICHAL R. BELKNAP, To IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A HIsTO-
RY OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY (1992) at 12. As Professor Belknap points
out, the movement to organize state bar associations and regularize admissions to the
bar through bar examinations did not begin until the late 1800s. Id. The American Bar
Association and the Los Angeles Bar Association were both formed in 1878. Id. See also
Patricia Phillips, Meeting Challenges: The Association's History ofAccomplishment, Los
ANGELES LAWYER, March 2003, 33.
16 An Act to Create the Office of Public Defender, Provide for His Election, Define
His Duties, and Fix His Compensation in the Several Counties, and Cities and Counties
of New York, reprinted in 55 ALB. L.J. 65 (1897) [Foltz's Defender Bill]. The bill is also
available in the appendix to Babcock, supra note 2.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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to be tried, the Public Defender could hire special co-counsel with judicial
approval. 19
It is noteworthy that Foltz's bill entitled all criminal defendants to rep-
resentation by the Public Defender regardless of whether they were indigent
or not. In her view the person of average means should not be "ruined by
payment of counsel fees in order to be protected from a malicious prosecu-
tion."20 She reasoned that because the right to the assistance of counsel was
a constitutional right, it should be free like other constitutional rights such
as the right to a jury.21 There was also a practical reason. As Babcock has
observed, Foltz correctly foresaw that if the Public Defender was only for
"the friendless and destitute" the office "would not command the respect
or resources necessary to do the job."2 2 The bill nevertheless provided that a
defendant with means still retained the option to hire his or her own counsel
who could defend either alone or jointly with the Public Defender.23
Although Foltz lobbied tirelessly for the Public Defender concept and
introduced bills in state legislatures across the country, it was not until
1913 that the County of Los Angeles amended its charter to create the first
Public Defender office, which opened its doors on January 7, 1914.24 In
contrast to Foltz's Public Defender who would be available to all, the Los
Angeles office represented only those who were financially unable to af-
ford counsel.25 The Los Angeles Defender was tasked with representing
19 Id.
20 Foltz, Public Defenders, supra note 1, at 393.
21 Id. at 398.
22 Babcock, supra note 2, at 1272.
23 Foltz's Defender Bill, supra note 16.
24 REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919) at 117 [SMITH].
25 Section 23, charter of Los Angeles County, which provides:
Upon request by the defendant or upon order of the court, the Public Defend-
er shall defend, without expense to them, all persons who are not financially
able to employ counsel and who are charged, in the Superior Court, with the
commission of any contempt, misdemeanor, felony or other offense. He shall
also, upon request, give counsel and advice to such person in and about any
charge against them upon which he is conducting the defense, and he shall
prosecute all appeals to a higher court or courts, of any person who has been
convicted upon any such charge, where, in his opinion, such appeal will, or
might reasonably be expected to, result in a reversal or modification of the
judgment of conviction.
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indigent defendants "charged in the Superior Court, with the commission
of any contempt, misdemeanor, felony or other offense." 2 6
Surprisingly, the Los Angeles charter also authorized the Public De-
fender to bring civil actions to collect unpaid wages (where the amount did
not exceed $100) and to defend any person unable to employ counsel who
was sued in civil court where in the opinion of the Public Defender the
defendant was being "persecuted or unjustly harassed."27 The reasons for
providing civil legal aid appear to have their origins in the reform move-
ment during the Progressive Era to improve the administration of justice
generally. In Justice and the Poor, published in 1919, Reginald Heber Smith
described in detail the defects in the administration of justice in America
which had given rise to the widely held belief during that era that there
was "one law for the rich and another for the poor."28 Because the poor
could not afford legal advice and representation, they were easily taken
advantage of and exploited. In response to this need for legal assistance,
legal aid societies sprang up in many of the larger cities. 29 Some, such as
the Voluntary Defenders Committee of New York provided criminal de-
fense representation. 30 While most legal aid offices were funded by private
donations, there were also a handful that operated as public bureaus of city
governments. 31 The Los Angeles County charter's provision of counsel in
certain limited civil cases reflects a similar attempt to give the poor access
to the courts, denied them due to the inability to afford counsel.
Although Smith devoted much of his analysis in Justice and the Poor
to the need for legal aid in civil cases, he also asserted that nowhere was
the injustice arising from the lack of adequate counsel more apparent than
in the criminal justice system. 32 Smith examined the assumption that the
rights and procedural protections given to a defendant were adequate safe-
guards against unjust conviction and concluded that standing alone they
26 Id.
27 Section 23, charter of Los Angeles County, supra note 25. This same provi-
sion was also enacted in state legislation establishing Public Defender offices. See CAL.
GOVT. CODE § 27706.
28 SMITH, supra note 24, at 105.
29 Id. at 176 and 187-191.
30 Id. at 117.
31 Id. at 173.
32 Id. at 105.
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were ineffective because "[a]dequate protection, in the last analysis, de-
pends on adequate representation." 33 Most defendants then, as now, could
not afford to hire counsel. The fairness of the criminal justice system thus
depended upon defense representation provided through a system of as-
signing counsel for the indigent accused.
Examining the assigned counsel system, Smith echoed many of Foltz's
arguments. Although counsel assigned in capital cases were generally paid
and given an allowance for expenses, in routine felonies, counsel was ei-
ther not provided at all, or went unpaid and without funds to conduct any
investigation. 34 Thus even a competent criminal defense lawyer appointed
to a case was forced not only to provide representation for free, but also to
pay for investigation expenses and expert witnesses out of his own pocket.
The lawyers who could afford to provide such pro bono representation,
however, were generally members of civil law firms and were largely ex-
empt from assignment because they had no experience in criminal work.35
Smith moreover found that the "shyster" lawyers Foltz had complained
about had taken over the assigned counsel system and corrupted it.36 Smith
observed:
These men have learned how to make a living out of assigned
cases.... They are willing to take assignments because they ... know
how to strip a prisoner and his relatives of every last cent... [by]
magnify[ing] the crime ... and the horrors of prison ....
If well paid, the professional assigned counsel undertakes a de-
fence [sic] that knows no bounds of honesty or propriety.... If not
paid, he is perfectly willing to betray his client by neglecting the
case, or forcing him to plead guilty, or deserting him altogether. 37
Thus except for murder cases, where reputable lawyers would step forward
because of a sense of duty and the potential to enhance their reputation,
the assigned counsel system deserved, in Smith's judgment "unqualified
33 Id.at 1ll.
34 Id. at 112.
35 Id. at 112-113.
36 Id. at 111.
37 Id. at 114. Smith maintained that it was because of the dishonest tactics of
these shyster lawyers that prosecutors had become "aggressive" and "partisan." Id. at
111 and 114.
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condemnation." 38 The salaried professional Public Defender envisioned by
Smith, would, by contrast, be honest, ethical, and provide uniformly com-
petent representation.
For Smith there was also an additional ideological reason for pro-
viding adequate defense services for the poor. This was necessary in his
view to prevent a loss of confidence in the judicial system that might
further encourage the anarchist movement. The turn of the century wit-
nessed economic changes that gave rise to conflict as a result of the pres-
sure from two growing influences - the escalating unrest between the
laboring class and their employers and the great wave of immigration
from eastern and southern European countries. It was a turbulent time
in American history - from the Haymarket Square bombing in Chicago
in 1886, and Panic of 1893 when the stock market crashed, to the assas-
sination of President McKinley in 1901 by an anarchist and the bombing
of the Los Angeles Times building in 1910.39 The fear of "sedition and dis-
order" created by these and other similar events clearly emanated from
Smith's writings.40
Smith was especially concerned about the masses of recently arrived
unskilled immigrant workers.41 The International Workers of the World
(known as the Wobblies), actively recruited such unskilled workers to join
38 Id.
39 See generally ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1960), ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967) and RAY GINGER,
EUGENE V. DEBS: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN RADICAL (1970). See also PBS, THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, TIMELINE: ANARCHISM AND EMMA GOLDMAN, [PBS TIMELINE]
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/goldman/peopleevents/e-freespeech.html
(All online sources cited in this article were last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
40 SMITH, supra note 24, at 11.
41 Due to political and religious persecution, famine and the lack of economic
opportunity, immigration jumped to almost 9,000,000 during the decade from 1900 to
1910. See Table No. HS-8. Immigration - Number and Rate: 1900 to 2001, available at
http://www.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-08.pdf. See generally ALAN M. KRAUT, THE HUD-
DLED MASSES: THE IMMIGRANT IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1880-1921. Smith observed in
JUSTICE FOR THE PooR that the immigrant
comes to this country ... with high hopes, expecting to receive fair play and
square dealing. It is essential that he be assimilated and taught respect for
our institutions.... When he finds himself wronged or betrayed, keen disap-
pointment is added to the sense of injustice. Through bitter disillusionment he
becomes easily subject to the influence of sedition and disorder. Id.
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its radical agenda, which was based upon Marxist principles. 42 During one
such effort in 1912, for example, San Diego passed an ordinance banning
union activity in its business district. This sparked protest demonstrations
which were brutally suppressed by both law enforcement and vigilantes. 43
It was against this backdrop of violence and unrest that Smith warned in
the Journal of the American Judicature Society that
the revolutionary proponents of a new world order ... may under-
mine public confidence in our justice if they attack its results, and
demonstrate its inequality in case after case. Such an attack might
come perilously near to succeeding because it has truth on its side.
The present drive for Americanization furnishes an illustration.
The plan is to educate the immigrant ... so that he will understand
and respect our institutions. But suppose after his education he
finds in America institutions which, in part at least, do not deserve
the respect of intelligent men. And if his contact with justice has
been in the lower criminal courts where he has been preyed upon
by runners, shysters and straw bondsmen,44 may he not mistake
42 The I.W.W.'s constitution, drafted in 1908, called for class warfare, proclaiming:
The working class and the employing class have nothing in common. There
can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found among millions of
working people, and the few, who make up the employing class, have all the
good things of life. Between these two classes a struggle must go on until
the workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the
machinery of production, and abolish the wage system.
PBS TIMELINE, supra note 39.
43 Rosalie Shanks, The LW.W. Free Speech Movement: San Diego, 1912, 19 THE
JOURNAL OF SAN DIEGO HISTORY, SAN DIEGO HISTORICAL SOCIETY QUARTERLY, No.
1, Winter 1973.
44 Straw bondsmen were individuals secured by shyster lawyers to swear false af-
fidavits pledging non-existent property to secure the amount of the bond. If the pros-
ecutor discovered the fraud, the bond was revoked, the defendant returned to jail, and
of course the amount the defendant paid to the straw bondsman was lost. Even if the
fraud went undiscovered, the bondsman would "surrender" his client at the first court
appearance and the defendant would be returned to jail. News reports suggest that this
practice was prevalent in California. A column reporting on court cases in a San Fran-
cisco paper in 1887, for example, noted two straw bondsmen were sentenced to sig-
nificant prison terms (six and seven years, respectively) and described the trial judge's
lengthy speech that "reviewed the evils of the straw bond business and severely cored
lawyers who would desecrate their oaths by offering to procure such bonds." The Straw
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the part which he knows for the whole and conclude that our judi-
cial institutions ought to be overthrown?45
Smith found a solution in the concept of the institutional Public De-
fender where counsel are paid for their services, resources are provided
to cover needed expenses such as investigation and expert witnesses, and
where "centralization of work makes for economy, efficiency, and respon-
sibility."46 Smith praised the results of the Los Angeles Public Defender
experiment and cited its work as empirical proof that the concept of an
institutional defender office was not "visionary" or "subversive of funda-
mental rights" as a prelude to socialism. 4 7
In its first year of operation in 1914 the Los Angeles Public County
Defender handled 260 felony cases. 4 8 Favorably comparing the results ob-
tained by the Public Defender with that of privately retained counsel, Smith
found that the Public Defender took approximately the same percentage
of cases to trial as private counsel (22% vs. 26% for private counsel), had
roughly the same success rate at trial (34% not guilty or hung jury vs. 36%
for private counsel) and obtained probation for a slightly greater percent-
age of his convicted clients than private counsel (33% vs. 30%).49 Smith
also argued that the Public Defender had improved the efficiency of the
court by filing fewer frivolous motions "for purposes of delay" and spend-
ing on average fewer days per trial than retained counsel.50 For example,
Smith cited statistics showing private counsel filed motions in 17% of their
cases but were successful only 6% of the time, while the Public Defender
filed motions in only 3% of its cases and was successful 25% of the time.s"
One striking fact revealed by Smith's statistics was that 70% of the
clients represented by the Public Defender pleaded guilty, while retained
Bondsmen Sentenced, DAILY ALTA CALIFORNIA, August 25, 1887, available at http://
www.newspaperabstracts.com/link.php?id=25776.
45 R. H. Smith, Denial ofJustice, 3 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 112, 113 (1919-1920).
46 SMITH, supra note 24, at 115-16.
47 Id. at 115 and 122-24.
48 Id. at 122. After civil service examinations, Walton J. Wood was chosen as the
first Public Defender. Id. at 117.
49 Id. at 123.
50 Id. at 122.
51 Id.
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counsel entered guilty pleas in only 48% of their cases. Foltz had detested
plea bargaining. In her view reducing a defendant's sentence because his
guilty plea saved the county the time and expense of a trial was akin to
bribery. She wrote: "Think of the spectacle of a court remitting part of a
criminal's legal punishment for a money consideration!! And yet who has
not witnessed it."52
Foltz was a strong proponent of the adversary system and believed the
truth emerged from the contest at trial fought by ethical advocates on both
sides. Smith and the reformers of the Progressive Era, on the other hand,
while not rejecting the adversary system, believed in a more collaborative
system of justice.53 Reacting to the dishonest tactics in which the shyster
lawyers had engaged with impunity, the Public Defender they envisioned
was not just an ethical trial lawyer, but also an officer of the court who,
while ensuring that the innocent were protected, would not stand in the
way of the guilty being fairly punished. This vision of the Public Defend-
er of course begs both the larger philosophical question of whether such
"truth" is indeed knowable and the more practical question of whether a
busy staff attorney at a Public Defender office with a heavy caseload and
limited resources for investigation has the ability to know the truth regard-
ing guilt or innocence. Smith's statistics, however, point to the Achilles'
heel of the Public Defender concept: the high volume of cases handled.
As Smith chronicled in Justice and the Poor, the Los Angeles experi-
ment was successful in eliminating the abuses of the shyster lawyers, and
the California state legislature subsequently passed legislation in 1921 au-
thorizing county governments to create an office of the Public Defender.54
That legislation, however, left it up to county governments to determine
whether or not to have a Public Defender and also whether the chief Public
52 Foltz, Public Defenders, supra note 1, at 399 n.2.
53 Smith, for example, praised the Los Angeles Defender's handling of insanity
cases because, instead of engaging in a battle of experts, the defender and prosecutor
agreed to have the court appoint three physicians to examine the accused and stipu-
lated that no other experts would be called at trial on that issue. Smith observed that
"[i]nstead of working at odds, it has been possible for the two attorneys to work in har-
mony to a common end." SMITH, supra note 24, at 121-22.
54 CAL. GOVT. CODE § 27700. The current statute is derived from legislation en-
acted in 1921.
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Defender would be elected or appointed.55 Thus in contrast to Foltz's bill
which mandated an elected Public Defender in each county, California has
evolved into a hodgepodge of arrangements for providing indigent defense
services. Only the Public Defender of the City and County of San Fran-
cisco is an elected official.56
In the 1960s and 1970s U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Gideon v.
Wainwright57 and Argersinger v. Hamlin5 8 vindicated Clara Foltz's belief
that defense counsel was constitutionally required in felony and misde-
meanor cases. This spurred the growth of Public Defender offices to handle
the constitutional mandate to provide counsel. The U.S. Department of
Justice sponsored the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Jus-
tice Standards and Goals (1973)59 and the National Study Commission on
Defense Services (1979) which promulgated maximum attorney caseload
standards and other guidelines for establishing such offices. In 1973, The
Other Face of Justice, reporting the findings of a nationwide study of in-
digent defense delivery systems, found that California had 31 Public De-
fender offices and 16 assigned counsel systems. 60 In 11 counties defense
services were provided through contractual arrangements with law firms
or individuals.
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER TODAY
Clara Foltz envisioned that a professional Public Defender would represent
virtually all criminal defendants. While this concept was never accepted
in theory, as a practical matter today more than eight out of ten defendants
accused of serious crimes in California are provided with counsel.61 Foltz
55 CAL. GOVT. CODE § 27701.
56 Web site of the San Francisco Public Defender's Ofice available at http://www.
sfpublicdefender.org.
57 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
58 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
59 NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
COURTS, 276 (1973). See infra note 97.
60 THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE, Appendix 1A, 90-91, and Appendix ID, 112-13.
61 See L. Benner, Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors that Contribute to Ineffec-
tive Assistance of Counsel in California 45 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW 263, 311
n.111 [Systemic Factors], reporting results from a survey of presiding Superior Court
judges indicating a state-wide indigence rate in excess of 85%.
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would be dismayed, however, at what has happened to the Public Defender
concept and the current crisis confronting the delivery of indigent defense
services. She, along with Reginald Heber Smith, would also find that like
the themes from Greek tragedies, the problems they identified still persist.
In 2008, the California Commission on the Fair Administration of
Justice ("Fair Commission") reported that 33 of California's 58 counties
now have an institutional Public Defender office which serves as the pri-
mary provider of indigent defense services. 62 While the number of coun-
ties employing an institutional Public Defender office grew by only two
since 1973, the number of counties using contract defenders more than
doubled. In 24 counties (most having a population of less than 100,000)
defense services are now provided by contractual arrangements with either
a law firm or solo practitioners. 63 Only one county, San Mateo, uses a bar
association administered assigned counsel system as the primary provider.
The San Mateo system, known as the Private Defender Program, actually
functions, however, much like an institutional defender office. It has an
investigative staff and employs supervising attorneys who provide training
and monitor the performance of assigned counsel panel members. 64
While the San Mateo assigned counsel system has been a success, it ap-
pears that the assigned counsel systems in other counties were replaced by
contract defenders. Unfortunately, California has had a disturbing history
with respect to contract defenders. Contracts for indigent defense services
are not regulated by any state standards nor is there even any requirement
62 FINAL REPORT, CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 92 (2008) [CCFAJ FINAL REPORT] available athttp://www.ccfaj.org/documents/
CCFAJFinalReport.pdf. An institutional Public Defender is defined as a county depart-
ment where attorneys are employed on a salaried basis as public employees. While the
primary institutional defender office handles the lion's share of indigent cases, other
arrangements must be made to represent co-defendants and other cases where the pri-
mary defender has a conflict of interest. This is done through the creation of one or
more alternate defender offices, or through an assigned counsel panel or by contractual
arrangement with a law firm or individual.
63 Id. There is a variety of contractual arrangements. One law firm, for example,
provides representation in eight different counties, while one county has seven separate
contracts with solo practitioners.
64 See SAN MATEO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION PRIVATE DEFENDER PROGRAM
ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009-2010, Administration and Structure, 6-7; Attorney
Training, 35-37; and Attorney Evaluation, 40-44.
187
CALIFORNIA LEGAL HISTORY * VOLUME 5, 2010
that performance of the contractor be monitored for quality control. A mono-
graph published by the U.S. Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Assistance
revealed the dangers of such unregulated low bid contracts in the following
report of a disastrous experience with a California contract defender:
In 1997 and 1998, a rural county in California agreed to pay a low
bid contractor slightly more than $400,000 a year to represent half
of the county's indigent defendants. The contractor was a private
practitioner who employed two associates and two secretaries, but
no paralegal or investigator. The contract required the contractor
to handle more than 5,000 cases each year. All of the contractor's
expenses came out of the contract. To make a profit, the contrac-
tor had to spend as little time as possible on each case. In 1998, the
contractor took fewer than 20 cases - less than 0.5 percent of the
combined felony and misdemeanor caseload - to trial.
One of the contractor's associates was assigned only cases in-
volving misdemeanors. She carried a caseload of between 250 and
300 cases per month.65 The associate had never tried a case before
a jury. She was expected to plead cases at the defendant's first ap-
pearance in court so she could move on to the next case.
One afternoon, however, the associate was given a felony case
scheduled for trial the following week. The case involved multiple
felony and misdemeanor charges. When she looked at the case file,
the associate discovered that no pretrial motions had been filed,
no witness list had been compiled, no expert witnesses had been
endorsed, and no one had been subpoenaed. In short, there had
been no investigation of any kind into the case, and she had no one
to help her with the basics of her first jury trial.
The only material in the case file was five pages of police re-
ports. In these reports she found evidence of a warrantless search,
which indicated strong grounds for suppression. She told the judge
she was not ready to proceed and that a continuance was neces-
sary to preserve the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel. The continuance was denied. The associate refused to move
forward with the case. The contractor's other associate took over
65 The national standard is only 400 misdemeanor cases per attorney per year.
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the case and pled the client guilty to all charges. The associate who
had asked for a continuance was fired. 66
The Justice Department report concluded: "In this California county, crit-
ics' worst fears about indigent defense contract systems came true. When
contract systems are created for the sole purpose of containing costs, they
pose significant risks to the quality of representation and the integrity of
the criminal justice system."67
In a deposition arising out of a lawsuit brought by the associate who
had been summarily dismissed, the contract defender stated that he was
able to handle such a high volume of cases because he pleaded 70% of his
clients guilty at the first court appearance after spending thirty seconds
explaining the prosecutor's offer.68 The county of Shasta, where this oc-
curred, subsequently established an institutional Public Defender office. 69
The Fair Commission observed that despite the notoriety of this disturb-
ing example of abuse, nothing has been done to prevent its recurrence and
reported that "flat fee contracts are still being negotiated for defense services
with no separate funding for investigators and ancillary services." 70 Indeed,
testimony before the Fair Commission revealed that some counties employ-
ing contract defenders have solicited bidding wars in an attempt to further
cut the cost of indigent defense services. The Commission reported the story
of one contract defender of long standing who had repeatedly fought off low
bidders in the past with the support of the judiciary. His budget, which had
been 41% of the District Attorney's budget in 2000, declined to only 27%
in 2005. Yet in 2006, he was undercut by a bid from a competitor that was
almost 50% less than his submission. He lost the contract he had repeatedly
held since 1990. According to the Commission:
He was undercut by a bid from John A. Barker & Associates, now op-
erating as Richard A. Ciummo & Associates. Ciummo now contracts
66 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, CONTRACTING FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 1-2 (2000).
67 Id.
68 CCFAJ FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 95 (citing deposition of Jack Suter in
Fitzmaurice-Kendrick v. Suter, Civ. S-98-0925 (E.D. Cal. 1999)). The lawsuit reportedly
resulted in a substantial settlement for the plaintiff. Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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with eight California counties to provide defense services. ...
Ciummo's operation has been described as the "Wal-Mart Busi-
ness Model" for providing defense services, "generating volume
and cutting costs in ways his government-based counterparts
can't and many private-sector competitors won't." Mr. Ciummo
responds that he operates on a single-digit profit margin, and sub-
stantial savings result from hiring attorneys on a contract basis
that does not include expensive benefit and retirement packages.
While his contracts with counties provide separate reimbursement
for interpreters and expert witness fees, there is no separate reim-
bursement for investigative services."
The Commission noted that the successful bidder's Web site contains
an advertisement stating: "What Would Your County Do With Hundreds
of Thousands of Dollars?" The advertisement suggests the answer ("Bet-
ter schools? Better fire protection? More police? Improved roads? More
parks?") and boasts: "Every county we have contracted with has saved sub-
stantial funds over their previous method of providing these services. Ad-
ditionally, our firm has an excellent record of containing cost increases." 72
In hard economic times, competitive bidding can obviously lead to a
dangerous downward spiral of cost-cutting that can result in bids that pro-
vide an inadequate number of attorneys who have little or no experience,
and who are given little or no training, supervision, or support services.
Unfortunately, no action has been taken to regulate indigent defense
contracting and evidence of abuse continues to be reported. For example,
Fresno County awarded a flat fee contract for $80,000 to an attorney in a
death penalty case where the Public Defender was unable to provide rep-
resentation because of a conflict of interest. On appeal, after the defendant
was sentenced to death, it was revealed that the contract attorney spent
less than $9,000 for investigation and expert witnesses, although in jus-
tifying his bid he had budgeted $60,000 for such expenses. The attorney
instead pocketed $71,000 of the $80,000 fee.73 It was conceded that even
71 Id. at 95 (quoting Cheryl Miller, Calif Defense Firm Borrows Wal-Mart Business
Model, THE RECORDER, Dec. 26, 2007).
72 CCFAJ FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 94-95 n.4.
73 People v. Doolin, 45 Cal.4th 390,457-58 (2009) (opinion of Kennard, J. concur-
ring and dissenting). The California Supreme Court assumed without deciding that
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though counsel was aware that the defendant had a learning disability
and had been abused as a child, the contract attorney failed to conduct
a background investigation and social study of defendant as required by
ABA standards governing the duties of defense counsel in capital cases. 74
In Sears v. Upton,75 the U.S. Supreme Court recently held that the failure to
conduct an adequate investigation into the defendant's background before
deciding on a mitigation strategy constituted deficient performance, even
where counsel employed a plausible mitigation strategy.
Another example that reveals the contrast in the quality of representa-
tion between flat fee contractors and institutional Public Defenders was
seen in the case of two juveniles who were both charged with the same
crime: assault with a deadly weapon. The older of the two was represented
by the Public Defender, but the younger, aged 15, was assigned a contract
attorney who took juvenile cases for a flat fee of $345 regardless of com-
plexity. The Public Defender's client was adjudicated in juvenile court, but
the younger boy, represented by the contract attorney, was charged as an
adult. Upon transfer to Superior Court he was represented by the alternate
Public Defender who immediately recognized that the child had serious
mental deficits and should not have been transferred to adult court. It was
later determined that the contract attorney had "failed to provide even a
minimal level of representation" and the case was transferred back to ju-
venile court.76
The Fair Commission, noting that state laws impose standards for
county contracts involving public works, has recommended that the state
legislature adopt at least minimal standards to protect against such dem-
onstrated abuses where the liberty of a citizen is at stake.77
counsel's performance was deficient, but on the record produced on direct appeal found
no prejudice was shown as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Two Justices (Kennard and Werdegar) dissented arguing that prejudice should be pre-
sumed because of the inherent conflict of interest created by the flat fee contract. Post
conviction proceedings are still pending.
74 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PER-
FORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989).
75 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010).
76 Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Juvenile Justice Diverges in Court, Los ANGELES TIMES,
June 14, 2010.
77 CCFAJ FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 97.
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THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN DEFENSE
AND PROSECUTION
Clara Foltz saw the institutional Public Defender as a means of correct-
ing the imbalance between counsel for the accused, who was often ei-
ther inept or dishonest, and the strong district attorney, who was often
overzealous because the "pride of contest" overcame the "spirit of jus-
tice."78 The institutional Public Defender office has, when properly im-
plemented, eradicated this gross imbalance. By providing an organiza-
tion where properly trained and supervised attorneys can embark upon a
professional career as a Public Defender, defense counsel can be on a par
with their counterpart in the district attorney's office and provide excel-
lent and cost-effective defense representation. The San Francisco Pub-
lic Defender, for example, represented over 28,000 clients during 2009,
obtained an acquittal rate at trial of 46.5% (which would be the envy
of many private practitioners who get to choose their clients) and saved
an estimated "$5 million in incarceration costs [through placement of
clients] in vocational, educational, substance abuse and mental health
programs." 79
There can be no doubt, therefore, that the scales of justice have tipped
toward a more even balance as thousands of dedicated career Public De-
fenders and their support personnel strive daily throughout California to
provide the best representation possible. As a former client of the Los An-
geles County Public Defender's Office stated in tribute after being acquit-
ted of murder on the grounds of self defense:
Even if I had $10,000 I couldn't buy that kind of defense.... And
here I am a nobody, just a 52-year-old bartender in a jam. When a
plain nobody gets a defense only a rich somebody could buy, you
got a real great country.80
78 C. Foltz, Duties ofDistrict Attorneys in Criminal Prosecutions, 18 CRIM. L. MAG.
& REP. 415 (1896).
79 Web site of the San Francisco Public Defender's Office, available at http://
sfpublicdefender.org/media/2010/01/ year-report-demand-public-defenders-remains-
high-economic-crisis/.
80 Web site of the Los Angeles County Public Defender, available at http://pd.co.
la.ca.us/History.html.
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Despite such successes, however, serious imbalances still remain. Foltz
could not have envisioned the tremendous volume of cases our criminal
justice system handles today. As a nation we imprison more citizens per
capita than any other country in the world.81 Starting with only 260 felony
cases in 1914, the Los Angeles County Public Defender (LACPD), for ex-
ample, now handles an "estimated 420,000 misdemeanor cases, 100,000+
felony cases, 41,000 juvenile cases and 11,000 mental health cases, for a
total of over 571,000 cases annually.82
Funding Disparities
The financial burden of providing counsel falls primarily upon county gov-
ernments. Recent empirical research conducted in 2007 for the Fair Com-
mission reveals, however, that tremendous disparities exist from county
to county regarding the resources allocated to indigent defense services.
For example, while the average spent per capita on indigent defense for all
counties is $19.62, Sutter County with a population of 91,000 spends only
$5.85 per capita.83 Significant disparities in expenditure also exist between
counties within the same population class. Butte County, for example,
with a population of 217,000 spends less than $10.00 per capita on indigent
defense while Yolo County, with a population of 190,000 spends almost
$31.00 per capita.84
Still more glaring is the disparity between funding for the prosecu-
tion and funding for indigent defense. As a consequence of local budgetary
decisions, the Yolo County Public Defender Office, for example, has been
forced to provide representation (including representation in a death pen-
alty case) with less than half of the resources of the prosecution.8 5 Looked
at from the viewpoint of resources per attorney, the district attorney has
the advantage of over $100,000 more per staff attorney than the Public
81 The United States imprisons over 700 persons per 100,000 population. R.
WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (7th ed.) King's College, London, In-
ternational Centre for Prison Studies, available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/
research/icps/downloads/world-prison-pop-seventh.pdf.
82 COUNTY OF Los ANGELES, ANNUAL REPORT 2009-10, 24.
83 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 309.
84 Id. at 310.
85 Id.
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Defender.86 An even more extreme example is Sutter County, which spends
five times more on prosecution than it does on indigent defense.87
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, Chief Justice Burger declared that "the sys-
tem for providing counsel and facilities for the defense should be as good
as the system which society provides for the prosecution.""8 Yet statewide,
for every dollar spent on prosecution, California counties spend only fifty-
three cents on indigent defense. 89 At least 85% or more of the criminal
docket in the Superior Courts of California, however, must be handled by
the indigent defense system.90 In some counties the indigence rate is as
high as 95%.
Prosecutors have argued that they need greater resources because they
have to screen arrests made by police that do not result in charges. This
argument has been refuted, however, by a statistical analysis which shows
that the additional prosecution workload to screen such arrests is more
than offset by the additional workload imposed on indigent defense sys-
tems to handle non-traffic misdemeanor cases that occur within cities. 91
Because these cases are prosecuted by the city attorney rather than the dis-
trict attorney, they are not part of the prosecution's workload. In addition,
the indigent defense system has other added workloads not shared by the
district attorney. It must also provide representation for clients involved in
involuntary mental health commitments and conservatorships. Thus, even
if privately retained counsel handle between 5% to 15% of the criminal
caseload, one would not expect to see such gross disparities in funding
between the prosecution and defense functions.
The disparity in funding between prosecution and defense is also
not limited to less populated counties that might be expected to have less
86 Id. This comparison actually overstates the resources per Public Defender staff
attorney because it is based upon the indigent defense budget for the county as a whole
and not all those funds go to Public Defender office. It also does not include additional
investigative resources available to the prosecutor from the city police, county sheriff's
department and state highway patrol.
87 Id. at 310.
88 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 43 (1972).
89 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 311.
90 Id. at 311 n.111.
91 Id. at 314 n.117. The comparison showed that indigent defenders handled over
60,000 more cases statewide than did county prosecutors.
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adequate financial resources. The Fair Commission study conducted an
in-depth examination of funding for the district attorney's office and the
indigent defense system in Santa Clara County, one of the richest counties
in the nation. In terms of per capita income, Santa Clara ranked 17th out of
3,000 counties in 2008.92 Yet in terms of parity with the prosecution, fund-
ing for Santa Clara County's indigent defense system was below the state
average. For fiscal year 2007 the Santa Clara prosecutor's budget was more
than twice that of all the indigent defense components combined. 93 This
translates into a dramatic disparity in staffing resources. The Santa Clara
County District Attorney's Office, which has its own crime lab (funded out
of a separate budget financed in part by fines from convicted drug offend-
ers pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.5) had a staff of over
500 in 2007.94 The primary and alternate Public Defender offices combined
had a budgeted staff of only 206.
This type of disparity in resources has consequences, as the indigent
defense system simply cannot keep up with the volume of cases gener-
ated by the more generously resourced law enforcement and prosecution
components of the criminal justice system. Once held to be an exemplary
office, the primary Santa Clara County Public Defender was forced after
budget cuts to ration representation and had to take the drastic step of no
longer providing counsel at misdemeanor arraignments. After newspaper
articles revealed that uncounseled defendants were pleading guilty at ar-
raignment without being aware of the consequences, some funding was
92 Id. at 318 n.122.
93 In addition to county funding, the Santa Clara District Attorney received
$1.4 million from the State of California's Department of Insurance and $1.9 million
from the federal government's Office of Emergency Services. Other grants included
an Anti-Drug-Abuse Enforcement Program Fund, Child Abuse Vertical Prosecution
Fund, D.A. Worker's Compensation Fraud Grant Fund, Hi-Tech Identity Theft Pro-
gram Fund, and Welfare Fraud Investigation Fund. Combined with county funds and
money from the Public Safety Sales Tax (known as Proposition 172 funds) the prosecu-
tor's budget for 2007 totaled over $86 million. The total funding for the Santa Clara
County Public Defender Office, Alternate Public Defender Office, and Legal Aid So-
ciety of Santa Clara County, which administers an assigned counsel panel to handle
conflict of interest cases the Alternate Public Defender cannot represent, totaled only
$42.7 million. Id. at 318 n.123.
94 Id. at 319.
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finally restored to the office. 95 If a prosperous county like Santa Clara can
only grudgingly muster the will to provide even basic defense services, the
picture appears bleak for the future of indigent defense in counties across
the state that are less financially well-endowed.
Excessive Caseloads
The disparity in funding might be less disturbing if Public Defender of-
fices were given adequate staffing to handle the caseloads generated by the
prosecution. However, as U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder candidly ac-
knowledged in his keynote address at the 2010 National Symposium on In-
digent Defense, Public Defender offices across the country are overloaded
with too many cases. California is a prime example. When asked to rate
the health of the institutional Public Defender in the county in which they
practiced, 73% of private practitioners certified as criminal defense spe-
cialists indicated that excessive caseloads were a significant problem for
the institutional Public Defender in their jurisdiction.96 The majority of
Public Defender offices in California carry caseloads that exceed the na-
tional standards promulgated by the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NAC). 97 In Santa Clara County, for
example, the Primary Public Defender office staff attorneys were attempt-
ing to handle more than 300 felonies annually, which is twice the national
standard.
A recent examination of the Los Angeles County Public Defender
(LACPD) shows the impact that the excessive caseload crisis has had on
95 Aram James, Public Defender Must Staff Misdemeanor Courts, SAN JOSE MER-
CURY NEWS, January 7, 2010; Public Defender Access Expanded, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, June, 26, 2010.
96 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 286.
97 Id. at 286 citing NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GOALS, COURTS, 276 (1973). Standard 13.12 specifies maximum caseload standards
per attorney per year as follows: for felonies (150), misdemeanors (400), juvenile (200),
mental health (200), and appeals (25). As the National Study Commission on Defense
Services later observed, however, these standards should only be used as a starting
point because only an actual workload study can determine the maximum number
of cases an attorney can effectively handle given the unique practice environment in a
particular jurisdiction, including logistical considerations and other operational char-
acteristics that impact defense representation such as prosecutorial charging and plea
bargaining practices and judicial sentencing practices.
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misdemeanor defendants. Observing the arraignment of misdemeanor
defendants, the author reported:
The processing of L.A. citizens in misdemeanor arraignment court
is nothing short of Orwellian. Detainees are brought into the
courtroom in groups, shackled together in pairs at the wrist, and
held in a cage-like enclosure [the 'box'] off to one side of the court-
room during the proceedings ... and must communicate with the
judge through slats.
LACPD misdemeanor attorneys dispose of 1,200 cases per
attorney per year, about three times the recommended national
maximum. In-court observation supports the conclusion that
LACPD's misdemeanor caseload is grossly excessive.... Only af-
ter their arrival at misdemeanor arraignment court do detainees
have the opportunity to speak with counsel for the first time. Po-
lice reports are transported along with detainees, so that Public
Defenders must await the arrival of their prospective clients before
viewing the evidence [against them].... The majority of misde-
meanor cases are disposed of by guilty pleas at arraignment. Since
detainees generally meet their Public Defenders only a few mo-
ments before appearing before the judge, many guilty pleas take
place without any investigation into the facts or the opportunity
for a full-scale interview. Terms of the plea agreement generally
include a fee representing recoupment of a portion of the cost of
providing Public Defender services.
The author witnessed a group of African American women pa-
raded into the box in groups of six, each shackled to a partner. In
order to rise and approach the slats when her case was called, each
woman was dependent upon the willingness, or unwillingness, of
her partner to rise and take a few steps. Each woman signed a plea
agreement, clumsily juggling papers between her free hand and
her shackled hand....
The confusion apparent in the L.A. misdemeanor arraignment
court is illustrative of an assembly-line type of justice. On one oc-
casion, a male defendant stood in the box, straining to hear the
judge, who spoke in a soft voice. The defendant called out, "I can't
hear you. I don't know what's going on!" A second defendant, a
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female, was informed that her bail would be $10,000, whereupon
she changed her plea to guilty so that she could be released. In
the latter case, California's bail bond system 98 and the defendant's
poverty determined the outcome.99
Recent news reports reveal that excessive caseloads in several counties
have become markedly worse. In June of 2010, for example, it was reported
in a "Gideon Alert," published by the National Legal Aid and Defender As-
sociation, that both the Sacramento County and San Joaquin County Pub-
lic Defender offices were operating with caseloads that were two to four
times the maximum allowed by national standards.100
Lack of Investigative Assistance
The maximum attorney caseload standards, moreover, are predicated upon
having adequate investigative assistance. Yet over two-thirds (69%) of the
presiding Superior Court judges surveyed in the study conducted for the
Fair Commission stated that the lack of resources to investigate indigent
cases thoroughly was a problem in their jurisdiction. '0 Two rural Public
Defender offices had no investigator on staff at all and one of those offices
reported having significant difficulty in obtaining court approval for funds
to obtain investigative assistance.102
Public Defender offices employing staff investigators reported that
their investigators were also laboring under excessive workloads. 103 The
98 To obtain bail the defendant would have had to pay the bondsman 10% ($1,000)
which was apparently more than the fine. L. BENNER, BAIL PROJECT MANUAL, 25, Cali-
fornia Western School of Law (2010).
99 Nancy Albert Goldberg, Los Angeles County Public Defender in Perspective, 45
CAL. W. L. REV. 445, 466-67 (2009).
100 See David Carroll, GIDEON ALERT: CALIFORNIA COUNTIES EXHIBIT WIDE DIS-
PARITY OF SERVICES, National Legal Aid & Defender Association, available at http://
www.nlada.net/jseri/blog/gideon-alert-california-counties-exhibit-wide-disparity-services.
101 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 278.
102 Id. at 288 and Figure 6 at 282. Also revealing was the fact that 100% of the in-
stitutional Public Defender offices reported that they had difficulty interviewing pros-
ecution witnesses. More than one quarter (27%) classified this problem as "serious." Id.
at 289.
103 Id. at 288.
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recommended standard is one investigator for every three attorneys.104 In
several counties, however, the ratio was discovered to be as high as eight
attorneys to just one investigator. One of these offices handled ten death
penalty cases during the year.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, the "core" of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel "has historically been and remains today,
the opportunity for a defendant to consult with an attorney, and to have
him investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial."105 In Powell v.
Alabama the Court recognized that the period between arraignment and
trial is "perhaps the most critical period" of the proceedings against an
accused.106 Because the majority of felony cases in California are dis-
posed of by guilty pleas that are entered less than 45 days after the filing
of charges, 0 7 the inability of defense counsel to conduct a prompt inves-
tigation into guilt or innocence thus amounts to nonrepresentation at this
critical investigative stage. Not surprisingly, an analysis of over 2,500 Cali-
fornia appellate court decisions involving claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel revealed that the failure to conduct an adequate investigation
has been a major cause of ineffective representation.108 By continuing to
tolerate excessive attorney and investigator workloads, we continue to run
an unnecessary and unacceptable risk that an innocent accused will be
wrongfully imprisoned or executed.
It should be noted that the difficulty created by the lack of adequate in-
vestigative resources is aggravated by several additional factors. First, vir-
tually all of the Public Defender offices have no contact with an indigent
defendant until they are appointed at the arraignment, several days after
arrest. 109 This delay jeopardizes the ability to preserve evidence and makes
it more difficult to locate witnesses who may be favorable to the defense.
104 NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE SERVICES, GUIDELINES FOR LE-
GAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS, STANDARD 4.1 (1976).
105 Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009) at 1844-55.
106 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
107 See CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 2010 COURT STATISTICS REPORT (cover-
ing fiscal year 2008-09) Tables 8a and 10a disclosing that the disposition of 71% of all
felony filings in California occurs in less than 90 days, while over half (56%) are dis-
posed of in less than 45 days.
108 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 277-78, Figure 3.
109 Id. at 290.
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Second, as a result of the loss of California's traditional preliminary
hearing, occasioned by the passage of Proposition 115, defense counsel no
longer have the right to confront prosecution witnesses at a preliminary
hearing. 10 The statements of witnesses, untested by cross-examination,
can simply be presented by a police officer, who may not even have been
the interviewing officer.' As a result, the preliminary hearing has become
an empty ritual that deprives defense counsel of the ability to make an in-
formed assessment of the prosecutor's witnesses' credibility and, given the
limited investigative resources otherwise available to the defense, effectively
precludes an intelligent evaluation of the merits of the case against an ac-
cused.112 To make matters worse, almost half of the Public Defender of-
fices surveyed by the Fair Commission study reported that felony cases are
routinely disposed of at a disposition conference held approximately a week
after the arraignment, prior to the time set for preliminary examination. 113
Where the prosecutor presents a "take it or leave it" offer at this early stage,
pressure is thus placed upon the defendant to accept the plea bargain before
there has been time to conduct any meaningful investigation.
Perhaps only a defense attorney who has advised a defendant to plead
guilty to reap the benefits of a "good deal" - and later discovers that the
client was innocent - can truly appreciate the wisdom of the law's com-
mand that a defendant should be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
When defense counsel, without adequate investigation, recommends that a
client pleaded guilty, the weight of that advice can tip the scales and cause
an innocent defendant to rationally forego a trial, the outcome of which he
believes is a foregone conclusion. Numerous cases have documented that
innocent defendants have pleaded guilty to avoid a more severe prison sen-
tence even though the evidence against them was later discovered to be per-
jured testimony and planted evidence. 114 Recognizing the vital role defense
110 Id. at 335-339.
111 Id.
112 While the prosecutor retains the right to call key witnesses, both indigent de-
fense providers and certified criminal defense specialists reported that key witnesses,
such as victims and eyewitnesses, were rarely or only occasionally called at a prelimi-
nary hearing. Id. at 337.
113 Id. at 294.
114 See Ted Rohrlich, Scandal Shows Why Innocent Plead Guilty, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1999, reporting on the Rampart Division police scandal in Los Angeles
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investigation serves in our adversarial criminal justice system, the ABA
Standards on Criminal Justice state that counsel has a duty to investigate
"the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts rel-
evant to the merits of the case ... regardless of the accused's admissions or
statements to defense counsel."" 5 An example demonstrating the necessity
for fulfilling this duty is found in the reported case of an innocent juvenile
who was charged with armed robbery of a cab driver and tried as a adult:
Footprints in the snow led from the crime scene to the defendant's
family home, where he was arrested and identified by the victim as
the robber. Although the youthful defendant expressed his willing-
ness to plead guilty, investigation disclosed that his older brother,
who would have faced life imprisonment as a habitual offender,
was the actual assailant. The family, believing the younger brother
would only be sentenced as a juvenile, had kept silent about the
misidentification in order to protect the older brother." 6
Prosecutorial Misconduct
"When a prosecutor plays by Machiavelli's rules and neither judge
nor counsel for defense resists, our system and all hope for justice
is destroyed."117
In a thoughtful and revealing book, Arthur Campbell, tells of convict-
ing an innocent man as a young prosecutor. Defense counsel had failed to
conduct an adequate investigation, the police had been inept, and Camp-
bell candidly confessed that he perhaps had been overzealous in his pros-
ecution of the hapless defendant because of "my warrior's will to win." The
story corroborates Foltz's view that prosecutors, in the heat of an adversar-
ial contest, can become caught up in, as Campbell puts it, "the fighter's lust
where corrupt officers committed perjury and planted evidence causing numerous
guilty pleas to be overturned. See also WHEN THE INNOCENT PLEAD GUILTY, The In-
nocence Project, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/When-the
InnocentPleadGuilty.php.
115 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DE-
FENSE FUNCTION 126, Standard 4-1.3(3) (3d ed. 1992).
116 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 289 n.49.
117 Arthur W. Campbell, TRIAL & ERROR: THE EDUCATION OF A FREEDOM LAW-
YER, VOLUME Two: FOR THE PROSECUTION, 123 (2010).
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for victory" and lose sight of the "spirit of justice" which should properly
guide their conduct.118
While intended to be a counterweight to correct this condition, under-
resourced and overburdened Public Defenders have not proven to be very
successful in preventing the type of prosecutorial abuses Foltz sought to
eliminate. Among the litany of unfair prosecutorial practices described by
Foltz, many would not be unfamiliar to readers of California appellate court
opinions today. A recent study of California appellate cases from 1997 to
2009 documented over 700 instances in which the court found that a prose-
cutor had committed misconduct. 119 In addition to the misconduct found in
People v. Wellsl 20 (interjecting inadmissible evidence for the purpose of prej-
udicing the defendant), the types of misconduct found by the Misconduct
Report ranged from intimidating witnesses to presenting false evidence.121
Also documented were constitutional violations that would not yet
have been established as such in Foltz's time, including discriminatory
jury selection, violating the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent and, perhaps most important of all, the failure to disclose exculpato-
ry evidence. 12 2 The Fair Commission likewise found substantial evidence
that prosecutors were not complying with their statutory and constitu-
tional obligations to provide essential information to the defense through
discovery procedures. An overwhelming majority (over 90%) of both de-
fenders and experienced private criminal defense attorneys reported that
prosecutors failed to turn over evidence favorable to the defendant (Brady
118 Id. at 122. Campbell, after discovering evidence post-trial that exonerated the
defendant, corrected the error. Id. at 105.
119 K. RIDOLFI AND M. POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECU-
TORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997-2009 [MISCONDUCT REPORT], Northern
California Innocence Project, Santa Clara University School of Law at 3.
120 Discussed Id. at 3.
121 See also Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630 (2005) detailing allegations in a
civil rights case against a San Diego prosecutor for suborning perjury in a murder case.
The lawsuit later settled out of court. Confirmed by conversation with Patrick L. Hosey,
attorney for Genzler.
122 MISCONDUCT REPORT, supra note 119, at 25. Prosecutors have a constitutional
duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, including evidence that could be
used to impeach a prosecution witness. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
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evidence) and delayed providing even routine information the defense is
statutorily entitled to receive in discovery.12 3
The Misconduct Report concluded:
[P]rosecutors continue to engage in misconduct, sometimes mul-
tiple times, almost always without consequence. And the courts'
reluctance to report prosecutorial misconduct and the State Bar's
failure to discipline it empowers prosecutors to continue to commit
misconduct. While the majority of California prosecutors do their
jobs with integrity, the findings of the Misconduct Study demon-
strate that the scope and persistence of the problem is alarming.
Reform is critical.124
Professional Independence
Gideon v. Wainwright established the right of state criminal de-
fendants to the "'guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against [them]."'... Implicit in the concept of a "guiding
hand" is the assumption that counsel will be free of state control.
There can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the services
of an effective and independent advocate.125
Clara Foltz thought the Public Defender should be elected to ensure
the professional independence necessary to carry out the defense func-
tion in an adversary system and guarantee equal stature with the District
Attorney. However, with the exception of San Francisco, today all Public
Defenders are chosen by county government, sometimes with judicial ap-
proval required, and serve at the will of either the county board of supervi-
sors or the county's chief executive officer. 126
Reginald Heber Smith had been wary of local government control over
the provision of civil legal aid and indigent defense services. In Justice and
the Poor, he wrote: "It is commonplace that many American municipali-
ties possess improper and inefficient governments in which politics play
123 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 279-80.
124 MISCONDUCT REPORT, supra note 117, at 5.
125 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 322 (1981).
126 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 299-300, CAL. GOVT. CODE § 27702 (West
2009).
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an undue part. It is always a question whether it is safe to entrust an es-
sential service such as legal aid to such a government." 12 7 Smith was here
referring to the unfortunate experience he had witnessed with respect to
publicly funded legal aid bureaus that were controlled by municipal gov-
ernments. Initially there had been adequate funding and little political
interference. 12 8 However, in 1917 several incidents made the dangers of
politically controlled legal services manifest. After an election in Dallas,
Texas, the new mayor dismissed the department head responsible for over-
seeing the Legal Aid Bureau and attempted to appoint his personal friend
to the bureau. When this prompted a "storm of protest" the mayor abol-
ished the Legal Aid Bureau.129 Similarly, in Portland, Oregon, that same
year, the attorney who headed the combined legal aid and defender office
(established in 1915) had not supported the newly elected mayor. Because
the attorney held a permanent civil service appointment and could not
be fired, the new mayor simply had the city council abolish the legal aid
and defender office. 130 Smith therefore concluded in 1919 that although
the "ultimate goal" was for legal services for the poor to "become part of
the state's administration of justice," whether they should be publicly or
privately funded in the short term was a matter that depended upon local
conditions. 131
Smith's insight that funding and control at the local level makes the
delivery of legal services for the poor vulnerable to political interference
unfortunately still resonates today almost a century later.132 California has
127 SMITH, supra note 24, at 184.
128 Id. at 185.
129 Id. at 185-86.
130 Id. at 186.
131 Id.
132 Although direct interference in the operation of a Public Defender office by
county officials would seem unthinkable today, it does occur. Recently, Chief Public
Defender Edwin Burnette of Cook County, Illinois, successfully sued the president
of the Cook County Board of Commissioners to prevent such interference with man-
agement of the Public Defender Office in Chicago. The county board president had
unilaterally selected thirty-four assistant public defenders for termination (called lay-
offs) and had ordered other staff to take unpaid furlough days. In a unanimous decision,
the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the county board president "lacked the author-
ity to select whom to hire, fire or retain among the public defender's staff." Burnette v.
Stroger, No. 1-08-2908, slip op. at 32 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 30, 2009). Unfortunately the
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had a sad history of harassment and termination of chief Public Defenders
who have had the courage to fight against excessive caseloads. Chief Pub-
lic Defender Sheldon Portman of the Santa Clara County Public Defender
Office, for example, was first reprimanded, then denied a pay raise and
finally fired after persistently challenging excessive caseloads. His offense
was stating at a public budget hearing that his staff attorneys would be
violating their ethical duty to provide competent representation and could
face professional disciplinary action if the board did not provide funding
for additional lawyers. Although Portman was later vindicated by an ABA
Ethics Opinion regarding the duties of defense counsel when faced with an
excessive caseload,133 he lost the legal battle over his vindictive firing.134
Unfortunately the Portman example is not an isolated incident. A chief
Public Defender, who was a member of the Fair Commission, related that
at the time they were offered the position, it was made very clear to them
that they would be expected to do the job with the limited resources giv-
en to them and if they could not, then the board would find somebody
else who would.135 In research conducted for the Fair Commission, three
fourths (73.1%) of the responding institutional Public Defenders reported
that county board pressure to keep costs down was a significant problem
courageous Chief Defender paid the ultimate price for this victory. While he was not
an "at will" employee, having secured the protection of a contract for a term of years,
he was nevertheless at the end of his contract, which was not renewed. See Hal Dardick,
Public Defender Wins Last Case Over Stroger; County Board Chief has Limited Control
ofAppointee's Office, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 1, 2009, at C6. Clara Foltz, who believed
in the democratic process, would perhaps not have been surprised to learn that county
board President Stroger subsequently lost his bid for reelection. Patrick Boylan, Stroger
era ends in Cook County, NWI.com, Dec 1, 2010, available at http://www.nwitimes.com/
news/local/illinois/article def 7c4be-8dl4-502b-87e3-ee4366014780.html.
133 ABA FORMAL OPINION 06-441: ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF LAWYERS WHO
REPRESENT INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS WHEN EXCESSIVE CASELOADS INTER-
FERE WITH COMPETENT AND DILIGENT REPRESENTATION, May 13, 2006.
134 See Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1993) hold-
ing that Portman had no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the "at will"
statute on Sixth Amendment grounds, and had no due process rights concerning his
termination because as an "at will" employee he had no property interest in his job. See
also Wilson v. Superior Court, 240 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) and Gail Diane
Cox, Public Defenders Find Independence Can Be Precarious, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 21,
1986 (both describing other similar incidents).
135 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 300 n.82.
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in their jurisdiction.136 The American Bar Association has recommended
that to safeguard professional independence, the oversight of a Public De-
fender system should be in the hands of a nonpartisan board of trustees. 137
However, none of the institutional Public Defenders in California appear
to have the protection of such a board.138
WHAT WOULD CLARA FOLTZ THINK OF
TODAY'S PUBLIC DEFENDER?
If Clara Foltz could return today to see how her concept for a Public De-
fender has evolved, she would no doubt be gratified to see how popular
and widespread it has become. The majority of California's counties have
adopted her basic idea, and for good reason. The institutional Public De-
fender office is, in theory, the most effective delivery system for providing
quality representation in a cost-effective manner. Its capacity to develop
and maintain skilled expertise, provide comprehensive training and su-
pervision, and furnish the support services and supportive environment
necessary for effective representation is without equal.
At the same time, however, she would undoubtedly be disappointed to
find that California's Public Defenders have been denied the independence
she sought to ensure. Imagine a district attorney or a judiciary that served
at the will of the county board of supervisors. Why should an equally im-
portant component of the criminal justice system be treated differently? The
lack of independence has been due in part to the failure to make the posi-
tion of chief Public Defender an elected office as Foltz envisioned, or in the
alternative, to insulate it from political pressure by having a governing board
of trustees, as the ABA has recommended. The lack of independence has
also been a result of the refusal to make the Public Defender available to all
136 Id. at 299-300.
137 ABA STANDING COMM'N ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM (2002) available at http://www.
abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf
These standards, approved by the ABA House of Delegates in February 2002, were cre-
ated to assist governmental officials and "constitute the fundamental criteria necessary
to design a system that provides effective, efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free
legal representation for criminal defendants who are unable to afford an attorney." Id.
138 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 299.
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criminal defendants, as Foltz planned. These omissions have made it diffi-
cult for the Public Defender to marshal political support for the institution.
The failure to have a broad base of political support for the Public
Defender has of course, as Foltz foresaw, made it more difficult to secure
adequate resources. Yet the Public Defender today represents more than
85% of the defendants accused of serious crimes. While the average citi-
zen probably never thinks about whether he or she could afford competent
criminal defense representation, a staff attorney from the Public Defend-
er's office is in fact the attorney upon whom innocent middle class citizens
must rely for their defense if wrongfully accused of a crime.
Funding decisions for the indigent defense system, moreover, have
been left in the hands of local officials who, chafing under an unfunded
mandated imposed by the federal Constitution, understandably desire to
spend only the bare minimum necessary to keep the system functioning.
Most defendants plead guilty because of the pressures created by a system
of plea bargaining in which no penalty is imposed upon a prosecutor who
overcharges to increase the incentive to plead. Thus, only enough funding
to process the "presumed guilty" is deemed necessary.
While Foltz would have been appalled at our current system of plea
bargaining, she would have been equally disturbed at the tremendous im-
balance between the resources allocated to the prosecution and the system
for providing defense services. The fact that on average a Public Defender
office receives only about half the resources granted to the District Attor-
ney makes it exceedingly difficult, even given heroic efforts, for the Public
Defender to serve as the counterweight that she envisioned would balance
the scales of justice. Equally troubling is the glaring disparity between
counties in their ability and in some cases their willingness to adequately
fund indigent defense services.
Nevertheless, the Public Defender has been able to achieve one goal of
both Clara Foltz and Reginald Heber Smith: the elimination of the incom-
petent assigned attorney and the unethical and greedy "shyster" lawyer
who preyed upon criminal defendants with limited resources and corrupt-
ed the unregulated assigned counsel system. Institutional Public Defender
offices have been successful in building a cadre of competent, profession-
al, well-trained career defense attorneys in many jurisdictions across the
state. But even here it would appear that the Public Defender has become
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a victim of its own success. Making the Public Defender a career office at
relative parity with the district attorney in terms of salary, health care and
retirement benefits, has caused it to become increasingly expensive.
Efforts by county administrators to curb expenditures on indigent de-
fense have thus taken two approaches. The first option has been to make
budget cuts which reduce staff levels and increase the caseloads handled by
the Public Defender office. Because Chief Defenders are "at will" employees
they risk their jobs (and their healthcare and retirement benefits) if they re-
sist. When courageous chief Public Defenders stand up to this pressure they
can either be replaced or the county can move to the second option.
The second approach has been to contract indigent defense representa-
tion out to the lowest bidder. While properly regulated contract defend-
ers can provide competent and cost effective services, this system is also
open to abuses. The primary contractor winning the bid, can in turn sub-
contract indigent cases out in lots to individual private attorneys. In this
way the entrepreneurial primary contractor can eliminate the overhead
expenses necessarily incurred in having a career office. No healthcare or
retirement benefits need be provided to subcontracting attorneys who may
be just starting out and need the work to help pay their office overhead
while they develop their practices. Because such contracts are unregulated,
there are no minimum requirements regarding the training or experience
levels of such subcontractors. Even where the primary contractor is quali-
fied, at least in terms of experience, that is no guarantee a qualified attor-
ney will actually perform the representation if there is no requirement that
the county monitor who is providing the services.
Likewise, in the absence of any regulation, there is no requirement
that the attorney providing the representation be currently trained, or su-
pervised or provided with adequate investigative services. Where flat fee
contracts are employed, there are built-in incentives to pocket the money
that should be used to conduct an adequate investigation and obtain com-
petent experts to assess forensic evidence that has increasingly been shown
to be unreliable. 139 Our criminal justice system should not be reduced to
139 See COMMITTEE ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE
COMMUNITY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SC-
ENCE, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD
(2009). See also Harry T. Edwards, The National Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic
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the status of a bargain basement where unregulated contracting of consti-
tutionally mandated legal services makes possible the return of the inept
and the shyster lawyer whom Clara Foltz sought to eliminate by creating a
public office that would attract career professionals.
As a result of making funding decisions based upon the presumption
of guilt, many Public Defender offices operate under crushing caseloads
while an increasing number of counties are cutting costs by providing in-
digent defense services through unregulated low bid contracts. The dan-
gers existing under both approaches are clear. So are the consequences.
During a 15-year period examined by a recent study, courts released more
than 200 inmates from California prisons because they had been wrong-
fully convicted. 14 0 While this is an astonishing figure, it does not mean
that the concept of the Public Defender has been a failure. Nor does it
mean that contract defenders cannot provide competent representation. It
does, however, mean that reforms are necessary to fulfill the potential of
either system to provide the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by
the Constitution.
SOLUTIONS
"I have been a public defender for over thirty years in three differ-
ent counties. There is a great disparity in the quality of defender
services throughout the state."141
What can be done? The fact that the members of the Fair Commission
in 2008 were unable to agree on any recommendation to solve California's
admitted funding crisis in indigent defense services speaks volumes about
Sciences: What it Means for the Bench and Bar, paper presented at the Conference on
The Role of the Court in an Age of Developing Science & Technology, Superior Court
of the District of Columbia, May 6, 2010, available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/
internet/home.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/NAS+Report+on+Forensic+Science/$FILE/
Edwards,+The+NAS+Report+on+Forensic+Science.pdf.
140 Nina Martin, Innocence Lost, SAN FRANCISCO MAGAZINE, November 2004,
available at http://www.deathpenalty.org/downloads/SFMag.pdf.
141 Comment made by a chief Public Defender from an urban Public Defender
office. Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 351.
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how politically difficult the problem is to solve.142 It was estimated in 2007
that to bring indigent defense services up to 85% of parity with the pros-
ecution, funding would have to be increased by approximately $300 mil-
lion. 14 3 The gap between prosecution and defense was widening then and
has likely increased substantially since that estimate.144
A significant portion of the funds needed to improve California's in-
digent defense system could be found by simply rethinking how we spend
our criminal justice dollars and redirecting the cost savings from some of
California's current poor choices. There are a number of areas where cost
savings could be achieved. These include: (1) abolishing the death penalty,
(2) abolishing mandatory minimum sentences, and (3) decriminalizing
some non-violent misdemeanor offenses by making them infractions. In
addition, fines currently given exclusively to law enforcement should be
shared so that an appropriate portion is given to the defense component
of the criminal justice system. Finally, the bail system could be reformed
so that defendants would pay 10% of the amount of bail to the state rather
than a private bail bondsman.145
While some of these solutions can only be addressed by state legis-
lation, local prosecutors can also exercise their discretion to reduce the
number of cases in which the death penalty is sought, and to make appro-
priate charging decisions. It is clear, for example, that more than a third
of the funding needed to improve indigent defense systems in California
could be found by simply eliminating the death penalty. The Fair Commis-
sion estimated that it costs $137.7 million annually to maintain the present
death penalty system in California. By contrast, only $11.5 million would
be required to handle these same cases if a sentence of life without parole
were imposed. Thus, $126.2 million in current expenditures could be em-
ployed to improve indigent defense in California. 14 6
142 The Fair Commission essentially punted on this issue by recommending that
the California State Bar reconsider the issue by convening yet another commission.
CCFAJ FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 99.
143 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 313.
144 The gap widened from fiscal year 2003-2004 to fiscal year 2007-2007 by 20 per
cent. Id. at 317.
145 Illinois, for example, operates such a system. See 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110-7
(2009).
146 CCFAJ FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 156.
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The Fair Commission also considered a proposal to establish at the
state level an Indigent Defense Commission similar to those that exist in
Texas, Virginia, Massachusetts and Indiana.147 Such commissions are em-
powered to set minimum performance and caseload standards and pro-
vide reimbursement to counties for meeting those standards. This proposal
has been objected to, however, by those who believe that California coun-
ties currently funding above such "minimum" standards would cut their
funding in a "race to the bottom." 14 8 In any event, given the state's current
economic condition (the current 2010 budget deficit is approximately $20
billion and is projected to rise to $25 billion by 2012149) it seems unreal-
istic to expect that funding for indigent defense services can be shifted to
the state. A recent study by the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics of state
funded and organized public defender systems, revealed that state fund-
ing was no guarantee that adequate resources would be provided. In 15 of
the 22 statewide systems, felony and misdemeanor caseloads still exceeded
national standards.15 0
For over thirty years there has also been a call for federal assistance
and the creation of a national Center for Defense Services. In 1977 the
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, to-
gether with the National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA)
and the National Clients Council, prepared a "Discussion Proposal"
for such a Center.1 s' The basic concept underlying this proposal was an
147 Id. at 99.
148 Id.
149 Anthony York, Brown calls Sacramento budget meeting for Wednesday, Los
ANGELES TIMES, December 2, 2010.
150 L. LANGTON, D. J. FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL RE-
PORT: CENSUS OF PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007: STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PRO-
GRAMS, 2007, September, 2010, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
spdpO7.pdf.
151 THE CENTER FOR DEFENSE SERVICES: A DRAFT DISCUSSION PROPOSAL FOR
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NONPROFIT CORPORATION TO STRENGTHEN INDIGENT DE-
FENSE SERVICES, ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Oc-
tober, 1977. Copy #37 of the Discussion Draft is on file with the author, who as National
Director of Defender Services of NLADA participated in drafting the proposal. In 1979,
Senator Edward Kennedy became involved in sponsoring a bill to create a center for
defense services. Defense Services Bill Still in the Works, 65 ABA JOURNAL 1629, No-
vember 1979.
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independent federally-funded granting entity constructed upon the fol-
lowing four principles:
(1) federal funding for the improvement of defense services must
be structured so as to provide continuity and stability over a
significant number of years,
(2) financial support should be instituted through a grant in aid
program;
(3) the funding program should contain incentives for local com-
munities to maintain and augment their current efforts; and
(4) the entity administering the program must be independent of
any of the three branches of the federal government.152
Based upon these principles it would be possible for federal assis-
tance grants to fund a Center for Indigent Defense Improvement in each
state requesting such assistance. Recognizing that a one-size-fits-all ap-
proach to standards is neither accurate nor politically feasible in Califor-
nia, the Center's first task would be to conduct an audit of the indigent
defense delivery systems of each county. The audit would determine the
need for additional attorneys, investigators, and other support person-
nel by conducting a Workload Assessment. Using methodology similar
to that designed by the National Center for State Courts to determine
when additional judges are needed, time studies can be employed to cre-
ate objective data upon which to make evidence-based decisions. Such
time studies can translate raw caseload filings into actual workload by
measuring real events that accurately reflect the unique practice envi-
ronment in a particular jurisdiction, including logistical considerations
and other operational characteristics that impact defense representation,
such as prosecutorial charging policies and judicial sentencing practices.
By learning how much time it actually takes to handle different types of
cases given, on average, their various levels of complexity, it can be math-
ematically determined how many attorneys will be needed to handle a
given mix of cases.
152 Id. at 53-54.
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After determining appropriate staffing levels, the center would then cer-
tify that a county is in compliance when those staffing levels are met.153 Cer-
tification would also be conditioned upon the professional independence of
the Public Defender being assured either by making the office a nonpartisan
elected position for a term of years, or by creating a nonpartisan board of
trustees, independent from any of the branches of local government, to over-
see the office. While provision would be made to retain the existing chief
Public Defender, the board would thereafter be empowered to select the chief
Public Defender and only the board would have the power to terminate the
chief Public Defender for good cause. The Board would also be authorized to
award contracts for indigent defense services that would be governed by the
same standards created for institutional Public Defender offices.
Upon satisfaction of these requirements, the county would then be re-
imbursed for the amount needed to bring the county's indigent defense
system into compliance with its own locally established standards. This
amount would become an annual subsidy payment to the county. The cen-
ter would also assist in providing training for new attorneys, investigators,
and support personnel, and in rural areas would create regional backup
service centers that would provide qualified investigators and sentencing
mitigation specialists in death penalty and other appropriate cases.
A condition of continued reimbursement would be a requirement that
the Center receive from each county basic statistical data sufficient to permit
it to monitor the health of the indigent defense delivery system. In the event
excessive caseloads reappeared and were not corrected within a reasonable
period, the Center would have the power to revoke the county's certification
and stop the annual subsidy payment. The negative publicity from de-certi-
fication, the legal impact this would have on ineffective assistance of counsel
claims arising from that county (as well as providing a basis for a lawsuit to
order compliance), and of course the financial impact of withdrawal of fed-
eral reimbursement, would provide strong incentives for voluntary compli-
ance with the maximum workload levels established by the Center. Because
this proposed hybrid system would provide each county its own unique
workload standard, there would be no race to the bottom.
153 The author is indebted to Marshall J. Hartman, former National Director of
Defender Services for NLADA who originally proposed the idea that defender offices
should be accredited the same as police departments and departments of correction.
213
CALIFORNIA LEGAL HISTORY * VOLUME 5, 2010
The argument for federal assistance is compelling especially because it is
the federal Constitution that requires the provision of effective assistance of
counsel. However, waiting for a federal bailout may also not be feasible in the
short term as action is needed now to correct currently existing conditions.
In Ligda v. Superior Court,154 the California Court of Appeal stated: "When
a public defender reels under a staggering workload, he ... should proceed
to place the situation before the judge, who upon a satisfactory showing can
relieve him."155 Litigation may thus be the most immediate way to obtain a
remedy. As New York's high court recently held in Hurrell-Harring v. New
York, a civil action to obtain injunctive relief will lie where "systemic" defi-
ciencies result in the denial of "core" assistance by counsel, despite the nom-
inal appointment of counsel. 156 The complaint in Hurrell-Harring alleged
that due to inadequate funding and staffing the indigent defense system was
"structurally incapable" of providing legal representation at critical stages
prior to trial as required by the Constitution. 57
There are also a number of other systemic conditions that could be
reformed such as bringing back the traditional preliminary hearing and
improving the discovery rules to ensure prompt and meaningful discovery
by the defense. But until we reduce the glaring disparity in resources both
between counties and between the prosecution and defense functions, we
destroy the promise of the Public Defender that Clara Foltz envisioned to
ensure administration of criminal justice honestly and equally for all.
154 Ligda v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.App.3d 811 (1970). The Court stated: "Such re-
lief, of necessity, involves the constitutional injunction to afford a speedy trial to a de-
fendant. Boards of supervisors face the choice of either funding the costs of assignment
of private counsel and often, increasing the costs of feeding, housing and controlling a
prisoner during postponement of trials; or of making provision of funds, facilities and
personnel for a public defender's office adequate for the demands placed upon it." Id.
at 828. The court was apparently not aware that county administrators would come up
with a third option: low bid contracts.
155 Id. at 827-28.
156 15 N. Y. 3d, 8, at 22-24, 930 N.E. 2d 217 at 224-226 (2010).
157 Hurrell-Harring v. New York, Brief for Plaintiff Appellants, 8, 2009 WL
6409871 (N.Y.). A multitude of systemic deficiencies were asserted including the fact
that in some circumstances misdemeanor defendants were not provided counsel at ar-
raignment. The complaint alleged as an independent claim that attorneys did not have
any meaningful contact with their clients nor were investigative services essential to
preparing a defense provided.
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On October 20, 2010, the County of Fresno took the first step toward dein-
stitutionalizing its primary Public Defender office by issuing the following
Request for Proposal:
The County of Fresno is soliciting proposals to provide appropriate
and competent primary indigent defense services and associated
criminal investigation services to financially eligible persons ac-
cused of crime in Fresno County, persons subject to the laws of
the juvenile court, and to all those entitled to services of court-
appointed counsel in other proceedings (services which have been
historically provided by the Public Defender's Office in the Fresno
County Superior Court).158
In fiscal year 2006-2007, the institutional Public Defender had 76 staff
attorneys and 19 investigators and was handling both felony and misde-
meanor caseloads twice the maximum allowed by national standards. For
fiscal year 2010-2011, the office was cut to only 48 staff attorneys and 9 in-
vestigators. As a result of such severe budget cuts, the chief Public Defend-
er felt he was ethically obligated to declare the office unavailable to accept
new cases and began refusing some new cases, which had to be assigned to
private counsel. 159 The County's response was to put all the primary indi-
gent defense services up for sale to the lowest bidder.
Research conducted for the Fair Commission found that the gap in fund-
ing between indigent defense and prosecution was significantly larger in coun-
ties employing contract defenders and those having an institutional Public De-
fender office.160 There was also a statistically significant relationship between
the type of provider and the rate at which felony cases were taken to trial: in-
stitutional Public Defenders were twice as likely to take a case to jury trial as a
contract defender.161 If Clara Foltz were here today she would no doubt sound
the alarm as she watched the dismantling of her legacy. *
158 COUNTY OF FRESNO, REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL NUMBER 962-4878: PRIMARY
INDIGENT DEFENSE, October 20, 2010.
159 Brad Brannon, Fresno Co. public defender cuts may backfire, FRESNO BEE, Sep-
tember 25, 2010.
160 Systemic Factors, supra note 61, at 315.
161 Id. at 316.
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